














This paper presents a framework for evaluating and accounting for the outcomes of ‘greenfield’ 
union organising campaigns. It argues that previous studies have tended to focus too much on the 
establishment of collective bargaining and negotiation of first contract as a campaign outcome. 
Instead, the effectiveness and representativeness of new union structures are emphasised, and the 
sustainability of those structures is emphasised as the most important outcome. A key finding from 
the empirical data is that campaigns that build both workplace activism and are coordinated by 
officers create more sustainable outcomes than campaigns that focus on one or the other. The 
evidence show how and why these outcomes emerge and the paper concludes with a consideration 












Given the increased attention to trade union organising in recent years and the significant 
investment in such activity by labour movements in many countries, it is important that we reflect 
on how effective unions have been in achieving organising objectives. In common with other 
countries (Carter et al., 2003, Fairbrother and Yates, 2003, Milkman and Voss, 2004), UK unions have 
invested heavily in training specialist organisers and have initiated campaigns to build membership 
and representation in workplaces where they have weak or moribund structures. A particular focus 
has been on establishing themselves in workplaces that have not previously been unionised – so 
called ‘greenfield’ organising campaigns (Heery et al., 2000b, Heery et al., 2003a). However, few 
studies have explicitly developed a framework through which to understand the factors that 
influence organising outcomes. The purpose of this paper is therefore to present a framework and to 
use it to explain variation in the effectiveness, representativeness and sustainability of outcomes in 
organising campaigns where unions have established a presence for the first time. 
 
The paper argues that previous studies fail to capture the diversity of organising outcomes largely 
because they use binary measures of whether or not particular objectives (recognition, bargaining 
first contract, membership engagement structures etc.) have been achieved at the point where a 
union withdraws resources from the campaign. In particular, previous approaches have often 
defined greenfield organising ‘success’ or ‘failure’ in terms of whether or not bargaining rights are 
established (see Bronfenbrenner, 1997 for a seminal study). Factors influencing ‘success’ or ‘failure’ 
in these studies have primarily been identified as variations in organising campaign tactics (see 
Bronfenbrenner, 1997, Ferguson, 2008, Heery et al., 2000b, Lynn and Brister, 1989 for studies 
advocating this position approach to some degree). The limitation of this is that the meaning and 
outcomes of recognition and bargaining vary considerably in different settings. Equally 
problematically, it pays little attention to what happens after recognition has been granted. Thus, it 
has become essential to move beyond binary measures of organising outcomes to explore the 
sustainability of different campaign outcomes and the conditions under which sustainable organising 
outcomes can be secured. 
 
This paper first examines different approaches to evaluating organising outcomes, before proposing 
a framework that allows us to capture a more qualitatively nuanced spectrum of outcomes. The 
central argument is that it is not sufficient to understand outcomes simply as a function of 
organising campaign tactics. Rather, the wider features of union structures and policies, the 
behaviour of employers and the wider context must be accounted for if we are to build a 
sophisticated understanding of why some campaigns are more likely than others to create 
sustainable gains for the labour movement. This paper analyses longitudinal data through a 
framework that focuses on the dynamics of organising campaigns. This allows for explanation of why 
and how particular aspects of campaigns facilitate and hinder sustainable organising outcomes in a 
way that previous studies have not. The research compares five organising campaigns that have all 
been identified by the unions involved as being ‘successful’. There is, nonetheless, considerable 
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variation in relation to the representativeness, effectiveness and sustainability. These variations are, 
it is argued, a function of the very different approaches to organising by the unions and the different 
contexts within which the campaigns take place. In other words, tactics employed during the 
campaigns are not, in and of themselves, sufficient to explain the variation in outcome. By 
considering the outcomes of particular approaches to and contexts of organising, the strengths and 
weaknesses of different approaches become visible. The central finding of the paper is that 
outcomes are most sustainable when there is both strong and representative workplace 
engagement and collective bargaining strength beyond the workplace. 
 
Evaluating organising outcomes 
Important early studies using US organising data (Bronfenbrenner, 1997; Bronfenbrenner and 
Juravich, 1998; Fiorito et al., 1995) used primarily quantitative methods to evaluate the impact of 
campaign tactics on organising outcomes. The US statutory processes for union recognition usually 
require data regarding the employer and the target workplaces to be lodged with the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB), thus giving researchers access to data on a range of aspects of both 
successful and unsuccessful campaigns. In conjunction with information on the tactics used by 
unions, these early studies identified a range of tactics which, when used together, significantly 
increased the likelihood of unions winning recognition and successfully negotiating a first contract 
(Bronfenbrenner, 1997, Bronfenbrenner and Juravich, 1998). Specifically, they provided rigorous 
evidence stressing the importance of unions building rank-and-file activism to tackle collective issues 
at workplace level. It is difficult to under-estimate the influence of these studies on both academic 
and practitioner debates in the US and beyond. Despite the importance and influence of these 
studies, the focus on the two key binary variables of ‘success’ or ‘failure’ (recognition and first 
contract) created the danger that these were seen as the most important, or only, outcomes of 
organising activity. More recent debates (Gall and Fiorito, 2011, Simms and Holgate, 2010) have 
problematised this perspective, but few studies have developed a systematic framework through 
which to evaluate organising outcomes more widely. 
 
The limitations of a binary approach to evaluating organising outcomes are evident in the example of 
UK employment relations where the empirical basis of this paper is located. In the UK, bargaining is 
not necessarily limited to covering a particular workplace or organisation. Equally, recognition of the 
union is not limited to a formal, legalistic process, nor does it necessarily include recognition for 
collective bargaining over terms and conditions of work. UK labour law, for example, explicitly allows 
for workers to be represented by their union in an individual grievance or disciplinary case even 
where employers formally reject collective bargaining. In other words, the binary approach to 
measuring organising outcomes fails to account for the extent and effectiveness of the union in 
influencing managerial decision making. Conversely, the binary approach leaves little opportunity to 
integrate the idea that union structures may exist, but be extremely unrepresentative of the 
workforce either in numerical terms (level of membership density) or more qualitative aspects such 
as the extent and nature of membership activism and engagement. Most importantly, binary 
measures allow little scope to evaluate whether or not union influence in the workplace is durable 
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over time. For all of these reasons, a wider and more nuanced range of outcome measures is 
developed in Figure 1. 
 
Framework for evaluating greenfield organising outcomes 
 
FIGURE ONE HERE 
 
The previous section introduced three outcome variables which each capture aspects of important 
debates in organising literature: 1) representativeness of union structures, 2) effectiveness of union 
influence on managerial decision making, and 3) the sustainability of organising campaign outcomes. 
These appear as the final two columns of Figure 1. This section explains how and why those outcome 
variables are important in evaluating greenfield organising outcomes and the kinds of evidence that 
may be used to reach judgments about campaign processes and outcomes.  
 
1) Representativeness of union structures 
Three important aspects of representativeness can be identified in the literature: membership 
density, membership activism and engagement with the wider union. Each is briefly discussed 
although, as we shall see, the themes and issues raised are often intertwined. 
 
The UK has strict laws against a closed union shop, so union density is a crucially important outcome 
of organising activity. The main relevant measures are at workplace, company or sectoral levels. 
Unlike many of the other measures, density can be evaluated quantitatively, although precise figures 
are often difficult to calculate. Membership density at workplace and company levels is important in 
demonstrating that the union speaks on behalf of members. It also helps the union exert influence 
over managers by demonstrating both the legitimacy of the interests represented, and also the 
potential for the use of coercive power to be mobilised if managers are intransigent (Simms and 
Charlwood, 2010). At sectoral level, density is also extremely important in exerting influence to take 
wages and other terms and conditions out of competition and to help renew union power across 
society more widely (Lerner cited in Crosby, 2005). 
 
The view that membership activism is a central objective of organising activity is frequently 
highlighted in organising debates. For some authors, member engagement in wider decision making 
structures of the union is as essential as workplace activism (Fairbrother 1996, 2000, 2003). These 
perspectives tend to emphasise the importance of members taking responsibility for identifying and 
resolving workplace issues through mobilisation, collectivisation and activism (Kelly, 1998). Union 
structures, it is argued, must change and adapt both to encourage this and to become more 
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responsive to a member-led movement (Carter, 2000) and engagement with the wider union is 
necessary for this transformatory process to happen. However, in a meta-analysis of empirical 
evidence, Hickey et al. (2010) establish that membership activism is rarely sufficient in and of itself 
to promote a transformation of union structures or indeed to secure effective organising outcomes. 
This lends further weight to the central point made here that it is necessary to evaluate a range of 
different organising outcomes. This is captured in Figure 1 by showing that it is quite possible for a 
union to establish effective influence over managerial decision making, but not be particularly 
representative, and yet still achieve successful and sustainable outcomes for members (perhaps, for 
example, by improving terms and conditions of work). 
 
Already we see that debates about both membership density and activism raise questions about the 
extent and nature of engagement of members in the wider union. Greenfield organising activity is 
likely to target new groups of members and the ways in which they engage (or not) with decision 
making structures is likely to create feedback for wider union policies about the interests of these 
new groups. Evidence of activism and engagement with wider union structures may include 
evidence of workplace representation, campaigning and negotiation, establishment of structures 
which are able to represent worker interests relatively independently from officers, and evidence of 
members from target workplaces attending and engaging with decision making structures such as 
branch meetings, regional events, and annual conferences. 
 
2) Effectiveness of influence on managerial decision making 
Debates about how unions influence managerial decision making have already been highlighted. 
Certainly membership density is not related in any simple way to effective influence over managers. 
Indeed, UK employment relations are fully of examples of workplaces and sectors where efficient 
collective bargaining takes place in the absence of high levels of membership density or activism. 
Evidence of formal collective bargaining is clearly relevant as an organising outcome but we also 
need to look for evidence of the union’s ability to influence managerial decision making more 
broadly. We therefore need to take account of the remit of the bargaining agenda, as well as any 
evidence that day-to-day managerial decision making is being influenced by the union. So, for 
example, it is possible to argue that a union that influences day-to-day managerial decision making 
in an informal manner through a network of active representatives at workplace level may, in some 
circumstances, be judged to be more effective than a union that agrees a loose framework of terms 
and conditions through collective bargaining, but which has little power to ensure the enforcement 
of that agreement. Similarly, evidence that managers routinely involve and consult the union in 
decisions as the consequence of an organising campaign would indicate a significant influence over 
managers. 
 
Taken together, the central point here is that recognition for collective bargaining and conclusion of 
a bargained agreement are not sufficient measures for evaluating organising campaign outcomes. A 
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broader perspective on the enforcement mechanisms for collective agreements and other evidence 
of unions influencing managerial decision making is also needed. 
 
3) Sustainability of organising outcomes 
What is often ignored in debates about organising is a third crucially important evaluative measure; 
the sustainability of organising outcomes. Specifically, the extent to which organising outcomes are 
durable after the resources of the initial organising campaign are withdrawn. Organising campaigns 
strive not simply to make an immediate change to working conditions, but to leave behind union 
structures that can continue to influence managers after the ‘organising phase’ of a campaign has 
ended (Simms, 2006). In the context of the UK, this typically involves both formal collective 
bargaining, and a system of representatives to engage with managers about the views of workers. 
There is increasing evidence from case studies that one of the most difficult aspects of organising 
activity is ensuring a successful transition from organising to representation (Markowitz, 2000; 
Simms, 2006; Wills, 2003). If union representation structures and effectiveness collapse after initial 
bargaining rounds, the long-term sustainability and effectiveness of the union’s presence and 
influence in the workplace is surely called into question. Further, the sustainability of union 
structures also highlights the extent to which the workplace members and activists are (or are not) 
involved in the wider decision making structures of their union. Links and networks both horizontally 
(e.g. with other branches) and vertically (e.g. up to regional/national levels of the union) within and 
beyond the union take time to establish and are important evidence of the sustainability of 
outcomes. Thus, evidence of sustainability or collapse becomes the third and most important 
measure of organising outcomes. 
 
Sustainability is also linked to, but not the same as, ideas about union power or union capacity 
(Dufour and Hege, 2000). For Lévesque and Murray (2000; 493) the power resources of importance 
to local unions are workplace mechanisms to build democracy and cohesion amongst workers, the 
capacity of the union to build links outside the workplace both horizontally and vertically with other 
workplaces, other unions, and community groups, and the strategic capacity of unions to set their 
own agendas rather than only responding to employer actions. These authors show that established 
unions are able to be most effective, representative and stable when they have all three power 
resources. What is not known is whether this is also the case when unions are establishing 
themselves for the first time. Here, the power of the union in the longer term will depend not only 
on their ability to establish sustainable organising outcomes, but also on their ability to mobilise the 
membership and influence over managers to both reinforce the legitimacy of their representative 
function and, where judged necessary, to exercise coercive power such as industrial action. These 
questions of union power are extremely important in broader debates about union renewal and the 
impact of organising campaigns on aggregate (Simms and Charlwood, 2010), although they go 
beyond the focus of this paper. Further, it is also clear that issues such as the legislative constraints 
on unions, the shift towards neo-liberalism in recent decades, changes in class identities and social 
positions of workers also constrain the long-term effectiveness and representativeness of unions. 
This paper focuses on organising campaign outcomes and what helps create sustainable outcomes. 




Taking these three detailed measures of organising outcomes, we can develop an understanding of 
the factors that influence and explain them that is more refined than previous studies. To do that, it 
is important to explain the first section of Figure 1 – factors that influence campaign tactics and 
messages. 
 
Influences on organising tactics and outcomes 
Previous studies stress the importance of the tactics and messages adopted by the union during an 
organising campaign as having important influence on outcomes (Markowitz, 2000). The evidence 
indicates that a wide range of campaign tactics is more likely to be associated with securing 
recognition and increasing membership (Bronfenbrenner and Hickey, 1998), especially when applied 
using principles derived from mobilisation theory (Badigannavar and Kelly, 2005). The messages 
developed during the campaign have a strong influence on how the union develops during the 
representation phase (Markowitz, 2000; Simms, 2006), but little attention has been paid to 
evaluating what influences a union to adopt particular campaign tactics and messages. Three 
observable factors can be identified as influencing tactics and messages and these appear in the first 
column of Figure One: union structures, union policies and the behaviour of employers. Before 
looking at these, however, it is important to account for the influence of the wider socio-economic 
context on campaigns. 
 
1) Socio-economic context 
Evidently, the wider context within which a campaign takes place exerts considerable influence over 
the actors, tactics and outcomes (Freeman and Pelletier, 1999; Gall, 2004; Gennard, 2002; 
Oxenbridge et al. 2003; Undy, 2002). Simms and Charlwood (2010) classify four groups of external 
influences that require attention when explaining the outcomes of union renewal efforts: ideological 
resources, the political and legal context, product market conditions, and labour market conditions. 
Previous authors have pointed to the ideology of employers (Simms and Charlwood, 2010), 
governments (Smith and Morton, 2006) and union officers (Kelly and Heery, 1994) as helping to 
explain why those actors behave in the way they do in relation to union organising.  
 
The central point here is that the consequences of judgments about the wider context can be seen in 
the behaviours of the key actors (unions, employers and workers). So, for example, the fact that the 
training organisation discussed in the later empirical section of this paper is a quasi-public sector 
organisation means that their service and labour markets face far less exposure to competition than, 
for example, the retail company or the casinos. This not only influences employers’ judgments about 
how to engage with the union during an organising campaign, but also influences the decisions made 
by unions about which employers to target, when to invest resources in organising, and what tactics 
to use. It may also impact the decisions of individual employees about whether or not to join the 
union and engage in collective actions. Importantly, though, the influences of the wider context are 
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complex and do not allow a simple ‘read through’ to predict the impact on actors’ behaviours. So, 
despite the fact that the retail organisation operated in a much more competitive labour and 
product market than some of the other case study organisations, the employer was considerably 
more supportive to the union. The reasons for this are discussed later and can largely be understood 
to be the consequence of a tradition of paternalistic management combined with a desire to reduce 
the chance of being targeted by a more ‘militant’ union. 
 
As a consequence, we can take the campaign as the unit of analysis and acknowledge these 
contextual factors by accepting that the decisions and behaviours of the key actors are an outcome 
of complex judgments influenced – but not determined - by the wider environment. Thus, the 
actions that are known and ‘visible’ (i.e. the behaviours of key actors during the campaign) are the 
focus of analysis here. The influence of these factors on campaign tactics and messages are filtered 
through the policies and structures of the unions undertaking the campaigns and the responses of 
employers to those tactics.  Thus, the framework presented in Figure 1 captures proxy measures for 
those wider influences on the decisions of key actors. 
 
2) Union structures 
Internal structures are important to campaign tactics and outcomes because they influence the 
extent to which the union is open to new membership groups (Briskin, 1999; Dølvik and 
Waddington, 2002; McBride, 2001; Pernicka, 2005) and ways in which members are expected to 
engage in decision making within the union (Flynn et al., 2004). In turn, this influences the extent 
and nature of the involvement of newly organised members once bargaining has been established. 
Similarly, structures are likely to influence the overall organising strategy that informs the level at 
which the union is attempting to organise. Much UK organising activity focuses at workplace level, 
but some unions have attempted to develop a sectoral strategy that builds influence across and 
between workplaces (Simms and Holgate, 2010b). It is evident that a union with a sectoral strategy 
will still need to secure union support at workplace level, but the campaign tactics and messages 
given to workers during the campaign are likely to be different from those focusing only at 
workplace level. 
 
3) Union policies 
Union policies are important because they directly influence campaign tactics, and also what 
happens to new members once bargaining has been established. An example here might be whether 
a union has an organising policy that places greater emphasis on the role of membership activism or 
central co-ordination by union officers. The options open to newly organised members in unions 
adopting contrasting policies will vary so that, for example, one might expect members to be more 
engaged with identifying workplace issues in a union that encourages membership participation 
than their counterparts in a union that exerts greater central co-ordination (Markowitz, 2000). As we 
shall see, this distinction is important in influencing the sustainability of organising campaign 
outcomes with the most sustainable campaigns doing both.  Unions also have very different policies 
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as to how they engage employers once they have established a relationship with them. Some, 
including the retail union Usdaw, focus more on building consensual relationships (Heery 2002). 
Others, for example the transport union the RMT, have policies and traditions of more militant 
engagement with employers (Darlington 2009). This is relevant because it impacts not only the 
campaign tactics and messages, but how unions seek to secure effective influence over managerial 
decision making in the longer term. Union policy and structures are intertwined and reflect the 
particular history and membership. So the unions with a structure that prioritises representation of 
workers across sectors may have policies which encourage organising strategies to focus beyond the 
workplace, which in turn will influence campaign tactics, messages and the outcomes of those 
campaigns. 
 
4) Employer behaviour 
Employer responses to organising activity are clearly important in influencing the campaign tactics 
and messages as well as the eventual outcomes (Bain, 1970, Heery and Simms, 2004, Machin, 2000). 
An example relates to the extent to which the employer is supportive or hostile to organising efforts. 
Different responses will influence not only the campaign tactics used, but also the options available 
to the workers if/when they eventually secure union representation (Gall, 2004). Lévesque and 
Murray (2005), however, point out that unions are more likely to be able to influence managerial 
decision making where they are not simply responsive to managerial agendas, but when they set 
their own strategies. Thus, the dynamic interaction between union behaviour and employer 
behaviour becomes important to consider in the framework and further emphasises that it is not 
intended to be a static representation. Rather, the objective is to underline that these factors 
interact in a dynamic process of organising activity.  
 
Overall, the framework presented in Figure 1 has two advantages over previous contributions. The 
first is that it attempts to capture judgments about a wider range of organising campaign outcomes 
whilst still being parsimonious. The second is that it looks not just to organising campaign tactics as 
explanatory factors facilitating or hindering particular outcomes but seeks to account for the 
influence of the wider context, union structures, union policies and employer behaviour. This, as we 
shall see, allows for a more robust explanation of the influences on campaign outcomes and 
especially on their sustainability (or otherwise). 
 
The research 
Evidence for this paper is taken from a 12 year longitudinal study (1998 to 2010) of the development 
of organising initiatives in UK trade unions. Detailed case studies were undertaken of five greenfield 
organising campaigns running between 1998 and 2005. They were selected because they were 
successful in establishing union structures in the workplace for the first time. The cases were 
identified in discussion with organisers and senior policy makers within the unions as examples of 
potentially ‘successful’ campaigns. Originally approximately 15 campaigns were identified, but most 
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failed to achieve representation rights. These were the remaining ones that did achieve some formal 
representation rights to influence management decision making.  
 
All five cases involved periods of non-participant observation of planning meetings, organising 
meetings with activists and the workforce, involvement in actions such as leafleting, and work-
shadowing the lead organisers while they planned and developed the campaigns. Periods of 
observation lasted from the identification of the campaign as a target, through to around a year 
after the campaigns had secured bargaining rights. Alongside the observation data, over the seven 
years of involvement in these campaigns, 102 participants were interviewed and 32 of them were 
interviewed more than once during that period – some as many as 4 times. Key participants included 
senior decision makers within the union, paid union organizers, generalist officers and negotiators, 
workplace activists, and workers including both members and non-members. Additional material on 
union strategies, policies and practices is drawn from over 200 further interviews with key actors at 
all levels of the UK union movement (members, activists, officials, organisers, policy makers etc.) and 
over 100 hours of observation, mainly of organiser training programmes such as the TUC’s 
Organising Academy (Heery et al., 2000a). Finally, documentary materials were collected and 
analysed. Of particular relevance to the research presented here were copies of organising materials 
(leaflets, etc.), copies of collective bargaining agreements, and strategy documents from both the 
national union and the campaign. All text-based materials (interview transcripts, documents, 
observation notes) were entered into Nvivo and coded thematically. Themes were identified both 
from existing literature and new themes were added when it was clear that participants were raising 
issues that had not previously been discussed in detail in academic papers. Particularly relevant 
themes for this paper relate to descriptions of union decision making processes, structures of the 
union, relationships between officers and activists, descriptions of organising activities and 
outcomes, assessment and evaluation of outcomes, and any evidence of long-term ‘problems’ 
emerging from these ‘successful’ campaigns.   
 
Table One summarises the key features of the five campaigns, including reference to each of the 
factors identified in the previous section. Inevitably, an academic paper cannot capture every detail 
of longitudinal research but the tables provide systematic evidence on the developments across the 
research period which are intended to supplement and summarise the evidence presented in the 
following sections. Further case description and analysis can be found in Simms (2006, 2007, 2011). 
The tables are structured to reflect the factors in Figure One.  
 
TABLE ONE HERE 
 
Evidence of organising outcomes 
Table Two summarises the outcomes of the campaigns as evaluated against the framework 




TABLE TWO HERE 
 
Evidence from the case studies illustrates the argument that both workplace engagement and 
central co-ordination are needed to build sustainable organising outcomes. The following section 
introduces the empirical evidence to highlight the complexity of the interactions between different 
features of campaigns and to stress the importance of understanding the ways in which those 
interactions influence campaign outcomes. This section first explains two of the campaigns (training 
organisation and retail chain) that were run with comparatively little member engagement, before 
describing the two campaigns (charity and call centre) that were run largely as an opportunistic 
response to worker demands for unionisation. This section concludes with a consideration of the 
campaign (casinos) that achieved a balance between the two. 
 
Two cases (the training organisation and retail chain) were run primarily because the organisations 
were a strategic target for the unions involved. Specifically, the unions (PCS and Usdaw respectively) 
had a strong sectoral presence and some bargaining leverage both within the target workplaces and 
with other employers within the sectors. Importantly this was the case even prior to the launch of 
greenfield campaign. Although the unions targeted these employers for different reasons, both 
campaigns formed part of a wider strategy for strengthening the union’s presence in the respective 
sectors. Further, the approach and outcome showed some similarities; the unions invested heavily in 
recruitment activity with relatively little time spent developing sustainable workplace activism prior 
to recognition. In this regard, the dominance of officers in the tactical decision making processes of 
organising campaigns is evident. 
 
In these cases, the unions secured constructive and supportive relationships with the employers and 
used this as a basis of gaining access to the workplace to recruit members. In the case of the training 
organisation, this was largely explained by the fact that many workers and managers had previously 
been part of the public sector and were familiar with the ‘culture’ of trade unionism commonly 
found there. For the retail chain it was largely explained by a desire to professionalise the human 
resources function and to head off any demands for recognition from a more militant union. As a 
consequence of the relatively good relations with managers, access to the workplaces was 
comparatively easy and union recruitment was highly dependent on trained officials and organisers 
who focused largely on ‘selling’ the advantages of joining the union. Organising activity was focused 
on identifying activists and building branch structures in workplaces with the intention that these 
activists would increasingly take over recruitment and representation activity. However, in both 
unions, there is a strong emphasis on officers taking responsibility for negotiations and there was a 
clear intention that this would continue after representation and bargaining rights had been formally 
secured. Workplace activists were largely expected to be union recruiters and to act as a conduit for 
workplace grievances to be passed up to officers. In some cases, officers were effective at 
negotiating improvements to workplace grievances, but the kind of rank-and-file intensive 
12 
 
organising campaign tactics advocated in much organising literature and training (Bronfenbrenner 
1997; Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 1998) was certainly absent. The argument here relates to the 
anticipated role of activists. In these campaigns (unlike the ones described later) the expectation was 
that they did little more than recruiting colleagues, distributing union information, and referring 
problems up to officers. As a consequence, concessions were mainly granted because management 
responded to professional intervention from officers rather than the building up of collective 
pressure of members and activists. For this reason, Table 2 refers to these structures as weak with 
officers taking on most of the representative function. 
 
In the training organisation, membership initially grew to around 40% density as a result of a 
concerted recruitment effort. Reflecting the statutory recognition legislation, management had 
agreed to concede a voluntary recognition deal if the union could demonstrate majority or near 
majority support. This prompted a significant effort on the part of the union to recruit quickly. 
Although the wider union structures within PCS union rely heavily on activists to build collective 
interests at workplace level, this campaign was unusual because it was identified as a strategic target 
rather than as an organisation where there was clear demand for membership. As a result, this 
campaign lacked effective and widespread activist engagement at workplace level. Unsurprisingly, 
membership quickly ebbed away so that a year after recognition it stood at less than 30% density. 
Activists and officers consistently noted the ‘vicious circle’ at both national and workplace levels of a 
reduced membership density leading to reduced bargaining influence, leading to less effective 
bargaining outcomes, leading to difficulties persuading workers to join the union. Assessed against 
the evaluation criteria, this campaign was initially successful at establishing representative union 
structures, and had some success in influencing managerial decision making over core terms and 
conditions of employment. But the membership was unsustainable and the relatively low union 
density seriously undermined the long-term effectiveness of officers by constraining their ability to 
place any coercive pressure on managers to concede negotiating wins. 
 
The retail campaign outcomes were far more positive. The union (Usdaw) has a strategy of relying 
heavily on union officials and organisers to recruit members not just in newly organised workplaces. 
This reflects the fact that many retail stores are very small and the sector has a high labour turnover. 
The union calculates that it needs to recruit around one third of its membership each year just to 
remain in a steady state. Here, however, there was more evidence than in the training organisation 
of workplace representatives taking on some roles representing members in minor grievances. 
Density across all the workplaces was around 70% a year after recognition rights were granted and 
the union has established an effective bargaining relationship with the employer which fits with its 
wider strategy of seeking ‘partnership’ with employers where possible (Haynes and Allen, 2001, 
Heery, 2002). However, this is not a campaign that has established significant levels of membership 
activism, and it is important to note that it did not seek to. In many respects, then, this is an example 
of a highly effective organising campaign because of the reliance on paid union officers to recruit 
and represent members. Activists are involved in the wider union structures through attending 
meetings, engaging in policy making, and attending regional and sectoral forums and the outcomes 
appear largely sustainable in the longer term despite the fact that it differs significantly from the 
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kind of member-led organising approach argued for by authors such as Fairbrother (1996) and 
Bramble (1995). 
 
By contrast, one of the campaigns clearly highlights the potential difficulties of pursuing a 
membership-led approach to organising. The call centre campaign was run using this approach. In 
other words, it was initiated as a result of workers being aggrieved by managerial behaviour and 
contacting the union (a “hot-shop”). The campaign focused heavily on building workplace activism, 
collective responses to workplace grievances, and shared responsibility for development of 
campaign tactics, despite the fact that the sector was not the union’s primary focus of membership 
or representation. The main weakness of this campaign was that these new members had little 
contact with the wider union (the CWU) which has its strongholds in the postal service and 
telecommunications employer, BT. Although they shared many features of their work with BT 
workers – especially call centre employees at BT – the union structures were so focused on 
representing the vast majority (well over 95%) of members working for the two core employers that 
there were few structures for integrating new members from other employers. As a consequence 
these new members were extremely isolated once recognition had been gained. Notably, for 
example, most of the business of local, regional and national union committees dealt with issues 
arising in the two main employers. 
 
Of course, the effort to target this call centre is evidence of the union’s commitment to trying to 
organise more widely within the telecommunications sector. However, after recognition this 
campaign saw the withering away of the lively activism and strong membership engagement that 
had developed in the organising stages and a related decline in membership density. The relative 
isolation of this group of members and activists meant that although workplace union structures 
became established and bargaining rights were conceded (although crucially not over pay), there 
was some evidence that influence over managerial decision making, activism and membership 
declined over time. By a year after recognition rights were granted there was comparatively little 
evidence of the previously enthusiastic membership engagement. This was accounted for by the fact 
that their issues were largely unrelated to those within the broader union and their opportunities to 
engage effectively in the wider decision making structures were constrained. As a consequence, the 
workplace union was expected to sustain itself and negotiating officers often had little experience 
outside BT and the postal service. Together these constraints fundamentally challenged the long-
term sustainability of the campaign outcomes. 
 
The campaign at the charity was notable for two very different phases. At first, organising efforts 
began with a strong workplace focus similar to the call centre. The reactions of management 
prompted a change of strategy on the part of the union. Managers reacted very negatively to the 
initial member-led and issue-based campaigning phase and made it clear to the organisers and 
officials involved that they were prepared to open a channel of communication with the union on 
the condition that this approach was changed. Activists and officers accepted this as a means to 
ensuring that union structures were formally established within the workplace, and that they were 
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effective in the sense that managers were prepared to engage with them. In the subsequent 
‘partnership’ phase of the campaign, officers did make an effort to link these activists into the wider 
union structures, but these were essentially efforts to encourage activists to share information 
rather than to encourage them to engage fully in the democratic structures or to establish a 
workable sectoral strategy. The campaign resulted in very low membership density and, as a 
consequence, managers refused to concede full bargaining rights. The union does have an influence 
on managerial decision making both through formal seats on the consultative works council and in 
some workplaces where density is high. And there is evidence of managers collectively consulting 
staff and union activists on a range of personnel issues. It is also important to note that although the 
union has a presence in this sector, there was comparatively little effort to link activists in these 
workplaces to the wider union and activists reported that they felt that the wider affairs of the union 
were largely irrelevant to them. As a consequence, the campaign outcomes became highly 
unsustainable. This was exacerbated by the difficulties recruiting and engaging members in a very 
large number of small and geographically dispersed workplaces. As a consequence of the low 
membership density in both the sector and the workplaces, there was little opportunity to use any 
form of coercive influence over management to extend formal bargaining rights which created a 
vicious circle of ineffectiveness in representation similar to that discussed above. 
 
Finally, the campaign in the casinos in London was run jointly by the TGWU (now Unite) and GMB 
unions and was notable for a very different approach from the others. The two unions developed an 
explicit strategy to try to gain bargaining leverage across the sector, albeit in one geographical 
location; London. The two unions established an agreement to co-operate in their recruitment and 
organising activity and were successful in targeting the five largest casino employers in London for 
recognition over a period of approximately 3 years. Activists built strong workplace campaigns 
around issues of concern to workers such as shift patterns and abusive customers. At the same time, 
regional officers and organisers co-ordinated actions, targeted resources and ensured that activists 
met regularly to discuss common issues and to plan tactics. The approach was extremely successful 
and after about three years of campaigning, recognition agreements had been concluded in all of 
the target employers. Managers granted some of the bargaining agreements voluntarily while 
others, including the one studied in depth for this research, were granted as a result of the statutory 
recognition legislation. What is important here is that both unions saw the workplace-level 
campaigns as part of a wider strategy and had clear plans to integrate the new members into the 
wider union. Activists and officers developed networks to share information and experience 
between workplaces and employers and officers have used the recognition agreements in the larger 
employers to put pressure on smaller employers to sign voluntary agreements. It is notable that 
along with the retail campaign, these are the two campaigns where membership in target 
workplaces has grown since recognition – although using very different approaches. 
 
In this case, membership activism has been sustained by investing considerable time and effort in 
building representation structures linking the workplaces to the wider unions. This allowed branches 
to develop to co-ordinate sectoral representation across the London region and they have a clear 
constitutional place within the wider union structures. The development of the branch structure is 
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part of a deliberate effort on the part of both activists and officers to develop a sectoral bargaining 
strategy which seeks to use concessions granted in bargaining with one employer to argue for similar 
improvements with other employers. Although, inevitably, this is not always successful, it is evidence 
of a very different kind of organising strategy than seen in the other campaigns. Importantly, this 
campaign shows evidence of success on the broadest measures of organising effectiveness. 
Membership and activism have proved to be sustainable and growing, structures are well-
established, and the union has a degree of influence over managerial decision making both through 
formal collective bargaining and day-to-day enforcement of rules and procedures. Importantly, there 
is also a clear link between these new sectoral structures and the existing decision making structures 
of the respective unions. 
 
Multi-level policies and structures for sustainable organising 
These case studies illustrate the ways in which the wider context, union structures, policies and 
employer behaviour affect campaign tactics which, in turn, influence organising outcomes. They also 
highlight why the sustainability of membership and activism is argued here to be the most important 
measure of organising campaign outcomes. Of course this is a dynamic process, but the framework 
allows us to see and account for a wider range of outcomes than in previous literature and to 
understand the decisions and structures that facilitate those outcomes. And it is important to 
remember that the unions proclaimed all these campaigns as examples of organising success. 
Although all have been successful in establishing union representation at workplace level, it is clear 
that there is a strong case to develop a more nuanced understanding of organising outcomes and to 
emphasise the importance of sustainability. This evidence shows that the most sustainable 
outcomes are in the casino case which has both worker support and co-ordination from officers. 
 
Taken against the wider measures of outcomes, the campaign in the training organisation is 
problematic because, although some progress has been made on national issues, there is little 
evidence of the union effectively dealing with workplace issues. Further, membership and 
representation structures are weak. In large part, this can be accounted for by the fact that this 
campaign was identified as a strategic target with little attention to the particular challenges of 
organising in these workplaces. In other words, the union policies drove a strategy for which there 
was not much support at workplace level. It was therefore extremely challenging to engage new 
members and encourage them to build the necessary skills to represent themselves effectively and 
to engage in the wider union structures. By contrast, the call centre campaign illustrates that 
focusing on workplace issues can be problematic as it can leave members isolated from the rest of 
the union. Again, workplace membership and representation structures have not proved durable. 
This can largely be explained because the union responded to the pressing demand and enthusiasm 
for unionisation emerging from the workplace, with little thought to the wider strategy or policy for 
integrating new members in areas beyond the core employers. The structures of the union mean 
that new members had to be located within branches that had little knowledge of working 
conditions outside BT. Branches are the primary mechanism for engaging in the wider structures of 
the union, so isolation within the branch means that members have few opportunities to participate. 
This also has consequences for the extent to which members can build up the necessary skills to 
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operate effectively in bargaining and representation. Thus, we can see that the structure and 
policies of the union have affected the campaign tactics and outcomes. 
 
The charity campaign failed to engage sufficient numbers of workers across the bargaining unit as a 
whole to secure strong and effective bargaining rights which limits the effectiveness of the 
workplace union and is related to the collapse of many of the workplace representation structures. It 
was identified as a strategic target and did have some support. But the response of the employer 
made it very difficult to secure sustainable, effective bargaining and representation. In order to 
overcome employer resistance, the union would have had to engage in very different organising 
campaign tactics to build more confrontational membership activism, which they had agreed with 
the employer not to do. This policy decision constrained the sustainability of the union in the longer 
term because it has limited the scope for bargaining and therefore the union’s ability to deliver 
improvements in working conditions for its members. 
 
Two of the campaigns (the retail chain and the casinos) can be judged to have generated more 
sustainable outcomes, despite significant differences between them. In both cases, we see 
workplace representation, growing membership, involvement in the wider union decision making, 
and some degree of the effective establishment of an on-going bargaining relationship with 
management. The central difference between the two campaigns is that, in keeping with the wider 
organising strategy, Usdaw’s retail campaign is led by officers of the union. The casino campaign, 
although instigated and co-ordinated by officers, involves workplace activists to a far greater extent 
and it is notable that this is also in keeping with the organising policies and structures of the GMB 
and TGWU (now Unite). 
 
In both campaigns, the unions have an explicit strategy that emphasises the importance of 
organising beyond individual workplaces, although this is driven by very different policies in the two 
unions. Usdaw has developed a structure and policies that place the responsibility for building 
sustainable outcomes on paid organisers and officers. This is largely a result of factors within the 
external context such as the high labour turnover in retail, which has knock on consequences for a 
high membership turnover for Usdaw. Together with the largely moderate policy of ‘partnership’ 
adopted by the union, this helps to explain why organising activities are driven from officers (Heery, 
2002). These policies fundamentally inform organising tactics which, in turn, influence organising 
outcomes. Some authors (Danford et al., 2005) have been critical of this approach and there are 
potential weaknesses. Officers’ time is expensive, and membership activism and engagement with 
the wider union is lower than in the casino campaign because workplace representatives generally 
take few responsibilities beyond distributing information and basic recruitment. More importantly, 
this case highlights that the union is also highly dependent on a relatively compliant employer who 




In the casino campaign, by contrast, the policy to focus organising at a sectoral (if geographically 
constrained) level had been developed as a response to the realisation that bargaining leverage 
would be weakened if the unions focused on organising ‘islands’ of unionism in a sectoral ‘sea’ of 
non-unionism. This sectoral strategy has allowed activists in the unions to engage both with each 
other and the wider unions, thus securing resources and support for the campaign and ensuring 
sustainability, effectiveness and representativeness in the post-recognition phase. This member 
engagement with the wider union was largely absent from the other campaigns (as shown in Table 
2) yet has proved to be extremely important as it ensured that these activists were not isolated from 
the wider union. The CWU call centre campaign, by contrast, perhaps most clearly shows the 
weakness of focusing on the workplace without broader engagement in the union. The activists 
within the call centre had little understanding of or engagement with the work of the wider union, 
and no meaningful engagement in the decision making structures of the union beyond the 
workplace. This isolation both limited the bargaining leverage of the union because negotiating 
officers had little understanding of their work and employer, and worked to exclude activists from 
branch meetings and other structures, thus giving few opportunities for these members to make the 
case for greater resourcing. The structures and policies of the two unions in the casino campaign 
encouraged them to develop strong workplace activism and to integrate new members into the 
union through sectoral and regional branches. Combined with the sectoral strategy, bargaining and 
representation have been comparatively effective in influencing managerial decision making, thus 
creating conditions conducive for sustainable organising outcomes. 
 
Leaders are important in these campaigns because they facilitate this ‘articulation’ of policy and 
practice between the workplace and central union. Importantly, leaders are both workplace activists 
and officers (Simms 2011). The cases allow us to understand how and why the articulation 
mechanisms are important in facilitating sustainable outcomes. The evidence illustrates how the 
engagement of both workplace activists and officers helps establish and reinforce the 
representativeness and effectiveness of the union by ensuring that both are working towards 
mutually understood objectives. Crucially, however, this is not a simple process of one group 
asserting dominance over the other, although there may well be differences of approach and 
perhaps effectiveness between officers who take different approaches to organising work. Kelly and 
Heery (1994: 25) identified differences of approach between “leaderist” officers who may be more 
prepared to let members develop their own agendas and campaigns, as compared to 
“managerialist” officers who placed more emphasis on ensuring that the rules and structures of the 
union were adhered to even where this may stifle activism. It is easy to imagine that these 
approaches to union work and engagement with members may lead officers to develop different 
approaches to organising work, but this would require further research to evaluate systematically. 
What this data shows is that where there is strategic oversight of organising, and where objectives 
are mutually agreed and understood between officers and activists, organising outcomes are more 
sustainable than in campaigns where these features are not present. 
 
Taken in the round, these findings emphasise the importance of unions bringing together both the 
representativeness outcomes and the effectiveness outcomes highlighted in the framework (Figure 
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1). Unions can establish workplace representation when only one is present. But the most 
sustainable outcomes appear to be when unions are able to integrate aspects of both. It is also 
evident that if organising is to repay the risky investment from unions, then sustainability of 
outcomes is essential. 
 
Conclusion 
Returning to the debates outlined in the outset, it is clear that it is essential to evaluate organising 
activity on a broader range of measures than in many previous studies. Hickey et al. (2010) rightly 
problematise the view that membership activism is the most important factor in explaining union 
organising outcomes. This evidence supports that analysis and extends it by presenting a framework 
through which to analyse a more nuanced range of organising outcomes and the factors that 
facilitate or hinder sustainable outcomes. The central contribution of the framework in Figure One is 
to argue that the most important evaluation of organising campaigns is the extent to which 
structures for effective representation and influence over managerial decision making are 
sustainable over time.  
 
An important conclusion emerging from the cases is that a favourable socio-economic context for a 
campaign is neither sufficient nor necessary to secure sustainable organising outcomes. This is 
particularly evident when we look at the influence of the labour market and product market on 
outcomes. We might predict that a stable business context might allow for more effective, 
representative and sustainable outcomes than a highly competitive product/service market. 
However, the outcomes in the highly competitive casino sector appear more sustainable than, for 
example, the monopoly supplier (call centre) or the quasi-public sector organisation (the training 
organisation). This strongly reinforces the point made by previous research (Bronfenbrenner and 
Juravich 1998) that union behaviour ‘matters’ in organising campaign outcomes. Unions can, 
sometimes, build successful organising campaigns in unfavourable circumstances if they pay 
attention to ensuring that their structures and policies support both member activism and 
leadership from officers. Exactly how those two come together is influenced by the history, structure 
and policies of the union, the behaviour of the employer being targeted, and the context within 
which the campaign takes place. But this evidence strongly indicates that even where the product 
market and/or labour market are extremely competitive, unions can deliver sustainable organising 
outcomes.  
 
Few studies have systematically assessed the interactions of these influences in different campaign 
contexts. These cases show that union structures such as the openness to new membership and the 
extent to which campaigns are organised at workplace, sectoral or national levels influence 
campaign tactics such as the extent to which newly organising groups connect to other membership 
groups beyond the workplace. In turn, this influences the sustainability of campaign outcomes 
because it affects, for example, the ways in which new membership groups engage in the decision 
making structures of the union. Union policies such as the approach to employers, policies relating 
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to the expected roles of new members and activists, and policies about the expected roles of paid 
officers and organisers influence campaign tactics such as the extent to which workplace activists are 
required to take on responsibility for identifying collective grievances and representing workers 
during a campaign. In turn, this influences the sustainability of campaign outcomes because it 
affects, for example, the skills of newly organised workplace representatives and their expectations 
of how to “be union” (Markowitz, 2000). Employer behaviour influences campaign tactics and 
outcomes by defining the terrain on which the campaign is undertaken (Heery and Simms, 2010) but 
not always in simple ways. Employer support can help build sustainable outcomes by providing 
resources and legitimacy for continued union involvement in managerial decision making. Resistance 
from employers can challenge the sustainability of outcomes, but can also facilitate innovation in 
campaign tactics and union policies that help create stronger and more sustainable outcomes, as in 
the casino campaign.  
 
The evidence reaffirms support for the argument of researchers such as Voss and Sherman (2000) 
and Markowitz (2000) that there are important roles for both workplace activists and union officers 
in building sustainable organising outcomes. Workplace activists are often not well placed to 
develop organising policies reaching beyond their workplace, and in most UK unions, that role can 
most feasibly be taken on by officers. This counters the view of authors such as Fairbrother (1996) 
and Bramble (1995) that workplace organising and the role of workplace activists in union renewal 
efforts should be prioritised over that of officers. While it is quite possible that officers can 
sometimes act as a brake on the ideas and wishes of workplace activists, this research indicates an 
important role for them in developing policies and structures that extend beyond the workplace. In 
this regard, the role of officers in providing co-ordinated leadership in organising campaigns seems 
particularly relevant. The particular contribution of this research is to explain why this multi-level 
approach matters so much: it appears to be central in ensuring the sustainability of organising 
outcomes.  
 
This multi-level approach seems important to overcome the potential weaknesses of many 
approaches to organising within UK unions. It also helps explain why over a decade of organising 
investment and activity within the UK has yielded little evidence of aggregate union renewal. A great 
deal of current greenfield organising policy is focused on gaining recognition in individual 
workplaces, with little coherent analysis of how to build sustainable representation and influence. 
Membership tends to ebb away if unions are unable to show their effectiveness (Terry, 2003), and 
an understanding of sustainable outcomes that concentrates only on the workplace level is a limited 
one. It is also important to note that although the framework is developed in the context of UK 
greenfield organising campaigns, it has the potential to be more widely applicable and further 
research may be able to establish its generalisability beyond this context. 
 
Sustainable organising is essential to any hope of wider union renewal because it relates directly to 
issues of union power. In workplaces with established unions, Lévesque and Murray (2005) found 
that unions with strong internal and external power resources which also pursued their own 
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agendas rather than simply being reactive were more effective in influencing managerial decision 
making. This data shows that a similar conclusion can be reached where unions are establishing 
themselves for the first time, indicating that the Lévesque and Murray (2005) conclusion is more 
widely applicable. These three factors taken together allow the key actors within unions to craft 
campaigns that are appropriate for individual workplaces building on the internal and external 
power resources available to develop effective, representative and sustainable influence over 
management. 
 
A wider question remains as to how these findings influence the implicit ‘cost-benefit’ evaluation 
made by unions in decisions about which campaigns to support and how to organise. The sectoral 
structures of the casino campaign clearly delivered significant advantages to the company-level 
campaigns and they would not be particularly difficult or expensive to replicate in other unions and 
other sectors. But even if sectoral strategies were problematic, the broader conclusion is that the 
central advantage of these structures was the co-ordination effect. By providing a structure within 
which campaigns within individual workplaces could be co-ordinated, the union was able to provide 
leadership from experienced officers whilst still giving a good deal of autonomy to workplace 
activists. Developing mechanisms to effectively “articulate” policy, practice and interests in this way 
is not costly and can be replicated if unions are attentive to the issues and have the will to ensure 
these systems are working well.  
 
It is important, however, to end on a note of caution. The focus of this paper has been on explaining 
the dynamics of union organising campaigns and argued that the broader political, economic and 
legislative contexts can be evaluated through the behaviours of the key actors during campaign 
activity. Nonetheless, the wider context must not be ignored when discussing the challenges to 
union organising activity on aggregate. It is clear that unions are “intermediary organisations” 
(Mueller-Jentsch, 1985) and therefore have to respond to the changing social, political and economic 
contexts. Union strategies need to account for and be responsive to the circumstances within which 
they find themselves (Hyman, 2007), and it is clear that many wider challenges remain which may 
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